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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : Priority #2 
v, : 
ROBERT A. DYER, : Case No. 89-0729 CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction 
rendered against appellant for possession of psilocybin with 
intent to distribute and possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, both second degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended); possession 
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as 
amended); and unlawful possession of marijuana without tax stamps 
affixed, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated, §59-19-106 (1953, as amended). This court has 
jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-
2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the underlying warrant for the search of 
appellant's apartment was so lacking in probable cause as to 
render a magistrate's belief in its existence unreasonable under 
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Consti-
tution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
The Constitutional provisions relevant to a 
determination of this case are: 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreason-
able searches and seizures shall not be violated; and 
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Robert A, Dyer, was charged in a nine 
count Information with one court of Arranging for Distribution 
of a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended); two 
counts of Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended); one count of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1953, as amended); three counts of Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance Without Tax Stamps Affixed, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §59-
19-106 (1953, as amended); one count of Aggravated Assault, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-
103 (1953, as amended); and one count of Failure to Stop at the 
Command of a Police Officer, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Annotated §41-6-13.5 (1953, as amended). 
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Appellant pled guilty to, and was sentenced on, the two 
second degree felony counts of possession with intent to dis-
tribute, and one third degree felony count of unlawful possession 
of marijuana without tax stamps affixed. The remaining counts, 
along with a separate single-count Information, were dismissed, 
(R. 65). 
On October 24, 1989, the trial court sentenced 
appellant to a concurrent, indeterminate prison term of 1 to 15 
years for the second degree felonies and 0-5 years for the third 
degree felonies. (R. 82). The court, however, issued a Certifi-
cate of Probable Cause and allowed appellant to post bond pending 
this appeal. (R. 71-73). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On February 1, 1989, a search warrant was executed at 
appellant's residence in Layton, Utah. (R. 14). The warrant was 
based on information presented in an Affidavit (attached in the 
Addendum hereto) signed by Detective Lon Brian of the Davis Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force (the "affiant"). (R. 14). 
The Affidavit states that the officer had received 
information from another officer that a third individual ("Infor-
mant I") told the officer two weeks earlier that appellant had 
sold Informant I some cocaine. (R. 17). The affiant also 
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claimed to have been told in the past by other informants that 
appellant trafficked in controlled substances. (R. 17). One of 
these informants, Informant II
 f allegedly told the affiant on 
January 23, 1989, that he observed marijuana in appellant's 
apartment. (R. 17). 
The affiant, as early as 1987, had also been informed 
that appellant sold drugs. (R. 18). 
On February 1, 1989, based on Informant Ill's tip that 
appellant was going to sell drugs to him later that day, the 
Davis Metro Strike Force officers approached and pursued appel-
lant's truck in a high speed chase. (R. 18). The officers, 
however, found no controlled substance in the truck or on appel-
lant when the vehicle was finally stopped. (R. 18). Informant 
III, who was with appellant during the high speed chase, 
allegedly "stated that Mr. Dyer [appellant] had [some] cocaine 
but threw it out of the window." (R. 18). The affiant then 
related that Informant II had given reliable information on past 
occasions. (R. 18). 
As a result of the search, quantities of cocaine, 
marijuana and psilocybin mushrooms were discovered and seized. 
Appellant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to four 
counts of the nine count Information, reserving his right to 
appeal the underlying search warrant as violative of the United 
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States and Utah Constitutions. (R. 65, 71-73). On August 28, 
1989, the trial court denied appellant's Motion to Suppress, see 
the Addendum, on the ground that the warrant underlying the 
searches and seizures was supported by probable cause. (R. 62). 
The court then sentenced appellant to a concurrent, indeterminate 
prison term of 1 to 15 years for the two second degree felonies 
and 0 to 5 years for the third degree felonies. (R. 82). The 
court, however, issued a Certificate of Probable Cause, allowing 
appellant to post bond pending this appeal. (R. 71-73). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The affidavit in support of the search warrant executed 
at appellant's apartment was so lacking in probable cause as to 
render the magistrate's belief in its existence unreasonable. 
The only information tending to support the presence of con-
trolled substances in the apartment were the naked assertions of 
Informant I, whose credibility the affiant never established. 
The magistrate's belief that such information established proba-
ble cause was, therefore, clearly unreasonable and violative of 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE POLICE OFFICER-AFFIANT LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BELIEVE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES WERE IN APPELLANT'S 
APARTMENT WHERE THE UNDERLYING DRUG DEAL HAD PROVIDED 
THAT APPELLANT WOULD DELIVER DRUGS IN HIS VEHICLE. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provides in relevant part that "no warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
person or things to be seized." In Illinois v» Gates, 462 U.S. 
213 (1983), the Supreme Court discussed the nature of a decision 
a magistrate must make in deciding whether to issue a warrant. 
Implicit in that discussion is a description of what constitutes 
probable cause to issue a search warrant. The Court stated: 
[The magistrate's decision is] simply to make a common 
sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set 
forth in the affidavit, including the "veracity" and 
"basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay 
information, there is a fair probability that contra-
band or evidence of a crime will be found in a particu-
lar place. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution is similar in 
all respects to the Fourth Amendment. The Utah Supreme Court has 
indicated a willingness to give broader protection, however, 
under Article I, Section 14. State v. Nielson, 727 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1986). 
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Id. at 238. 
Similarly, in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 
(1984), the Court held that where a warrant has been issued by a 
committing magistrate, the exclusionary rule will not be applied 
unless the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause 
as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable. 
In the present case, there was no information tending 
to show that any of the evidence seized would be located in 
appellant's residence. Thus, Officer Brian's Affidavit lacked 
any indicia of probable cause as required by Gates and Leon. 
First, Informant I, whose reliability the affiant never estab-
lished, had allegedly seen, two weeks earlier, approximately nine 
ounces of cocaine in the apartment. (R. 18). The affiant, and 
the officer who related this information to him, both failed to 
verify the truthfulness of Informant I's assertions. 
Similarly, a week before the execution of the warrant, 
Informant II allegedly observed small quantities of marijuana in 
appellant's residence. (R. 18). Although the affiant vouched 
for her reliability, Informant II did not specify the quantity of 
the marijuana she had observed, nor did she intimate whether it 
was for personal use or distribution. In State v. Adkinsf 346 
S.E.2d 762 (W. Va. 1986), the court ruled that an affidavit which 
asserted that a confidential informant had observed marijuana 
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inside the premises was insufficient to establish probable cause. 
The court further held Leon inapplicable in such a situation, 
since "good faith" reliance would not apply. 
The instant case is analogous to Adkins. Here, the 
only information tending towards possible criminal activity on 
appellant's part, other than Informant II's naked assertions, was 
Informant I's observation of him two weeks earlier in possession 
of a certain quantity of cocaine. 
Equally unreliable and lacking in probable cause was 
the affiant's statement that appellant agreed to sell Informant 
III an ounce of cocaine on the day the warrant was executed. 
According to the affiant, the sale of an ounce of cocaine was to 
be consummated in appellant's vehicle, not in his apartment. (R. 
18). Such information should not, therefore, have furnished a 
magistrate probable cause for issuing a search warrant to search 
the residence, since the use of the vehicle increases the proba-
bility that the drugs were being picked up at a separate loca-
tion. See Gates, supra; Adkins, supra. In addition, Informant 
Ill's statement that appellant threw the cocaine out of the 
vehicle's window during the high speed chase adds nothing to the 
threshold inquiry. Gates, supra: Leon, supra. Even if appellant 
had thrown some cocaine out of the truck, that did not compel, in 
the instant case, a finding of probable cause to search 
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appellant's apartment. At best, such an act furnishes the 
officers probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of 
appellant's truck and person. 
The only information relating to the presence of 
controlled substances in appellant's apartment was Informant I's 
two-week-old observation concerning possession and sale of 
cocaine, an observation which the officers failed to promptly 
pursue. Thus, it was unreasonable to believe that the informa-
tion related by the informants, coupled with the affiantfs unsub-
stantiated allegations, established probable cause. Conse-
quently, the Leon exception to the exclusionary rule should not 
apply in the instant case. Thus, appellant urges this court to 
reverse the trial court by holding unconstitutional the under-
lying warrant executed for the search of his apartment* 
POINT II 
THE MAGISTRATE ABANDONED HIS DETACHED FUNCTION AND 
ACTED AS A RUBBER STAMP FOR CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE 
POLICE OFFICER. 
Appellant submits that, under the circumstances in the 
instant case, the issuing magistrate, by not requiring facts 
substantiating the officer's claims, abandoned his neutral and 
detached role. In other words, the magistrate became an ally of 
the police and merely "rubber stamped" the officer-affiant's 
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statement* See, e.g., Leon at 3244; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979). When the Leon Court established 
the good faith exception, it nevertheless retained the long 
standing rule that: 
. . . it remains for the reviewing court to 
decide whether the magistrate performed his 
neutral and detached function on the facts 
before him, and did not merely serve as a 
rubber stamp for conclusions drawn by the 
police. U.S. v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341, 345 
(2d Cir. 1983). 
Leon at 914. 
In the instant case, the magistrate did nothing more, 
given the facts before him, than serve as an unquestioning ob-
server and rubber stamp for the conclusory statements of the 
affiant. There were no independent facts confirming the 
affiant's conclusion that appellant was a drug dealer who was 
selling drugs from his residence. All that was presented to the 
magistrate were facts tending, at best, to show that appellant 
would sell drugs to someone from his truck. There was no con-
crete, reliable information demonstrating that appellant sold 
drugs or was about to sell drugs in his apartment. 
In State v. Avala, 762 P.2d 1107 (Utah 1988), police 
officers had arranged a controlled drug buy at the defendant's 
residence seven days prior to the execution of a search warrant 
for the residence. The Utah Supreme Court, in response to the 
- 11 -
defendant's probable cause challenge, noted that the officer had 
observed the controlled buy and thus had knowledge that it had, 
in fact, occurred at the defendant's residence. After quoting 
the Gates rule, the court concluded: 
[A] 11 of these events were within the per-
sonal knowledge of the officer. Contrary to 
defendant's argument, the only part of [the 
officer's] affidavit in which the knowledge, 
veracity and reliability of a confidential 
informant are at issue involves the second 
informant's naked assertion that heroin was 
being sold out of the residence. The second 
informant's hearsay evidence is merely cor-
roborative of the more substantive informa-
tion contained in the affidavit. In issuing 
the warrant, the magistrate had available 
first hand observations of the affiant, an 
experienced narcotics officer. 
Id. at 1115. 
Contrary to the facts in Ayala, the officer-affiant in 
the instant case had no first-hand knowledge regarding any sale 
that took place or was to take place in appellant's apartment. 
Further, the supplementary but naked assertions of the informants 
added nothing to the magisterial inquiry. Thus, the affidavit 
presented to the magistrate in the instant case was a "bare 
bones" affidavit, unsupported by probable cause. Under Gates and 
Leon, suppression of the fruits of the illegal searches and 
seizures is appropriate since there was no showing of probable 
cause by the affiant. The magistrate, in issuing the warrant in 
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the instant casef therefore abandoned his neutral role by rubber 
stamping the conclusory statement of the officer-affiant. 
CONCLUSION 
The seizure of the evidence in the instant case 
pursuant to the search warrant was violative of appellant's 
rights described in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, This court should, therefore, 
reverse the lower court and vacate appellant's convictions and 
sentences on all counts and order that the matter be set for 
trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this day of 
February, 1990. 
RONALD J. YENGICH 
Attorney for Appellant 
- 13 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to 
the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84114, this day of February, 1990. 
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A D D E N D U M 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Courthouse 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-3227 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
In Re: Search of the 
residence located at 
181 Cushing Way 
Layton, Utah 
occupied by Robert Dyer 
AFFIDAVIT FOR 
SEARCH WARRANT 
) COUNTY OF DAVIS 
STATE OF UTAH ) ss: 
Before the honorable K. Roger Bean, Circuit Court Judge, 
the undersigned, being first duly sworn, deposes and says that 
he has probable cause to believe that on the premises which are 
described as: 
nee located at 
Way 
tah 
Occupied by Robert Dyer 
there is now certain property described as: 
Controlled Substances 
Razor blades, mirrors, and plastic or metal 
tubes used to ingest controlled substances. 
Other types of drug paraphernalia used to ingest 
or facilitate the sale of controlled 
substances• 
Records, account books, or other forms of recorded 
narcotics trafficking. 
Pictures, receipts, personal property or other 
items evidencing ownership, occupation or 
control of the above premises or rooms therein. 
The facts to establish the issuance of this warrant are as 
follows: 
1. That the affiant is an investigator with the Davis Metro 
Narcotics Strike Force and is familiar with the facts presented 
herein. 
2. Affiant received information from Richard Bliss, an 
officer with Davis Metro Narcotics Strike Force that a 
confidential informant told him approximately two weeks ago that 
Robert Dyer had in his residence at 181 Cushing Way, Layton, 
Utah, approximately nine ounces of cocaine, one of which the 
\£- informant purchasedj 
/ ^ \ Affiant has received information in the past from four 
otntec^nformants that Mr. Dyer was trafficking in controlled 
substances. 
4. Affiant on January 23, 1989, had one of the four 
J(\ informants in Mr. Dyer's residence where narcotic paraphernalia 
and small quantities of marijuana were observed. The informant 
further indicated that Mr. Dyer told him that he would be 
^ obtaining additional controlled substances, specifically 
X 
marijuana, in the next few days. 
5. Affiant further had information from a third informant 
in November of 1987 that the informant had been purchasing pound 
0 quantities of marijuana and hallucinogenics from Mr. Dyer. 
6. On February 1# 1989, affiant was present during recorded 
communication between an informant and Mr. Robert Dyer wherein 
/\Mr. Dyer agreed to provide a one ounce quantity of cocaine to the 
informant. The informant was given instructions to contact Mr. 
Dyer from a payphone on SR 193 and Fairfield in Layton. Affiant 
was informed by Officer Bliss that the initial contact with Mr. 
f/by&r had been by telephone to MrT DyerA^-^e^dtence. 
7. The informant then indicated that he was to meet Dyer at 
another location and officers of the Davis Metro Narotics Strike 
Force observed the informant inside a white truck being driven by 
Mr. Dyer. 
8. After the observations, affiant engaged in a high speed 
chase and observed baggies being thrown out of the truck. The 
truck was finally stopped and affiant spoke with the informant 
who stated that Mr. Dyer had the cocaine but threw it out of the 
window. 
> 
,*^ 
* V^'^T I 9> Affiant believes that the informant that was in the 
X* 
^ r W r residence on January 23 is reliable as he has been involved in 
^ prior narcotics transactions that have resulted in the arrest and 
conviction of over 20 persons. 
10. Based on affiantfs experience and training as a 
narcotics officer, a drug dealer will often keep records and 
accounts of their transactions, and proceeds of their dealings 
will appear in sales receipts and bank records. These same 
receipts and bank records show ownership and occupancy of 
the residence and its contents. 
8. Based on affiant's experience and training as a 
narcotics officer during the last three years it is often the 
case that a drug dealer or user 
will keep miscellaneous paraphernalia to facilitate their use of 
narcotics, and the dispensing of them. The dealer will also keep 
records of drug transactions and evidence of ownership or 
residency of the premises within the residence itself. 
9. Affiant believes from the foregoing that there is 
probable cause to believe that there are controlled substances 
and other items as identified herein within the above mentioned 
residence. Affiant further knows that the residence will need to 
be searched during the nighttime as Mr. Dyer has been arrested 
and may contact someone to eliminate any controlled substances 
that may be within the residence. Affiant is further aware that 
controlled substances may be easily destroyed and concealed and 
that dealers in controlled substances often maintain weapons at 
their residence for use in protecting themselves and their 
controlled substances and therefore requests authorization for 
entry of the residence without announcing the officer's purpose 
or identity. 
WHEREFORE, affiant prays that a search warrant be issued 
for the search of the above described premises and the seizure 
of any of the said items and that the same be authorized for 
issuance in the nighttime without notice of purpose or authority, 
5/.ic^_.i„.Ml.K 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to me this 1st day of February, 
1989. 
S / (^j^£^l__fe_^5_bl 
Circuit Court Judge 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD^efAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS ,>"£TATE OF UTAH 
THE
 tSTATE OF UTAH, Si 
/ RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
Plaintiff / 
s^~y() / • T 0 SUPPRESS 
VS. / / \ I yS 
ROBERT/A. fcitt, / / : Case No. 6378 & 6380 
Npekand^nt. • 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for 
hearing before the above-entitled court and the court having 
reviewed that portion of the transcript referred to by counsel 
and having reviewed the affidavit and search warrant and 
memorandum submitted by counsel and being fully advised in the 
premises hereby rules as follows. 
In the first instance, the court recognizes that the 
traditional test of Aguilar and Spinelli, which set out a two 
prong test which had to be met to establish the reliability of an 
informant as a basis for a search warrant, has now been abandoned 
by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the State 
of Utah. Spinelli vs. The United States 393 US 410, 21 L Ed 2d 
637 (1969), Aguilar vs. Texas 378 US 108, 12 L ed 2d 723 (1964); 
Illinois vs. Gates 462 US 213 (1983); The State of Utah vs. 
Anderton Utah , 668 Pacific 2nd 1258 (1983). 
The hypertechnical requirements of the Spinelli and 
Aguilar have now given way to a common sense interpretation based 
on a totality of the circumstances. 
The U.S. Supreme Court in Gates Supra it states 
sitsuccinctly when it held: 
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a 
practical, common-sensed decision whether, given all of the 
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, 
including the "voracity and basis of knowledge" of the 
person supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that the contraband or evidence of crime in a 
particular place. 
Our own Supreme Court in discussing the common-sense 
approach stated in the Anderton case quoting from Spinelli: 
That probability and not prima facia showing 
a criminal activity is the standard of probable 
cause in judging probable cause issuing 
magistrates are not to be confused by niggardly 
limitations or by restriction of the use of their 
common sense, and their determination of probable 
cause should be paid great deference by the 
reviewing courts. 
In reviewing the affidavit in support of the warrant 
herein questioned, the warrant contained the following 
information. 
The affiant had received information from four 
different informants that defendant was trafficking in controlled 
substance. 
Affiant was informed by a particular informant that he 
had purchased pound quantities of marijuana and hallucinogens 
from defendant in 1987. 
Detective Bliss, an associate of the affiant's on the 
task force, reported that one of his informants had told him that 
he had been in the Dyer home at 181 Cushing Way in Layton 
approximately two weeks prior to the date of the affidavit and 
that defendant had in his possession nine ounces of cocaine at 
the residence and that the informant had purchased one of the 
ounces. 
That one of the four informants had told the affiant 
that he was in defendant's residence on January 23, 1989 and had 
observed marijuana and drug paraphernalia. That the defendant 
had represented that he expected to receive additional controlled 
substance specifically marijuana within the next few days. 
That said confidential informant had previously been 
involved in the arrest and conviction of over 20 persons involved 
in drug transactions. 
That the affiant was present on February 1, 1989, the 
date of the search warrant, and recorded a conversation between 
the informant and the defendant wherein defendant agreed to 
provide one ounce of cocaine to the informant. 
The defendant instructed the informant to go to a 
certain pay phone to call the defendant. 
The informant advised the affiant that he was required 
to meet the defendant at another location. 
The affiant observed informant in a truck driven by the 
defendant. 
A high-speed chase ensued with the affiant pursuing. 
Affiant observed baggies being thrown out of the truck. The 
truck was eventually stopped. Informant informed the affiant 
that defendant had the cocaine but threw it out the window during 
the chase. 
Affiant was an experienced officer working on the drug 
task force, was experienced with the drug scene and the manner of 
doing business therein. 
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was aware 
that drug dealers often keep,accounts of transactions, proceeds 
from deals, and bank records at their place of residence. 
Affiant as an experienced narcotics officer was also 
aware that drug dealers often keep drug paraphernalia at their 
residence to facilitate the use and dispensing of controlled 
substances. 
Affiant was informed by a fellow officer, Detective 
Bliss, that the initial contact with the defendant had been by 
telephone at his residence. 
With the foregoing facts, this court concludes that 
from all of the information set forth in the affidavit taken from 
a common sense point of view there was a fair probability that 
defendant resided in the residence in question and that 
controlled substance, paraphernalia, and records of drug 
trafficking would be found therein. 
Even assuming for the purposes of argument that the 
affidavit in question was inadequate to support the warrant, the 
court concludes that evidence obtained in the case would be 
admitted under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
as set forth in U.S. vs. Leon 468 US 897, 82 L ed 2nd 677 
(1984). 
The Leon Court recognized a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule and in so doing ruled that inherently 
trustworthy, tangible evidence obtained in reliance on a search 
warrant issued by a detached 'and neutral magistrate may be 
admitted even though said warrant is ultimately found to be 
defective. 
In so doing the Leon Court recognized that the 
exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safe 
guard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrent effect. It 
was designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish 
errors of judges and magistrates. 
The court went on the say that suppression of evidence 
obtained pursuant to a defective warrant should only be ordered 
on a case by case basis and only in the unusual case in which the 
exclusion would further the purpose of the exclusionary rule. 
As that court stated, there is no deterrent effect 
where the offending officers acted in an objectively reasonable 
belief that their conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
In discussing the deterrent effect of the exclusionary 
rule, the court indicated that the rule assumes that the police 
have engaged in willful or at least negligent conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right; where the official action 
was pursued in complete good faith, however, the deterrent 
rational loses much of its force. 
In the matter here before the Court, the warrant was 
properly executed, the officer searched only those places and for 
those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by 
the warrant. 
The record and the evidence is devoid of any indication 
that the affiant misled by information that affiant knew was 
false or would have known was false except for his reckless 
disregard of truth; or that the magistrate wholly abandoned his 
judicial role, or that the warrant was based on an affidavit so 
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the official 
belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. 
This court believes that the officers in this case 
acted with objective, good faith in obtaining the warrant and 
acted reasonably within the scope thereof and that, therefore, 
even assuming that the affidavit was defective to exclude the 
evidence so obtained would not further the ends of the 
exclusionary rule in any manner, but would only tend to make the 
officers less willing to do their job in the future. 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant's motion to 
suppress is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2 & ^ day of August, A.D., 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
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